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THE GOALS OF FDA REGULATION
AND THE CHALLENGES OF
MEETING THEM
Ralph S. Tyler†
The subject of this article is regulation, specifically regulation of
products within the jurisdiction of the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). My perspective is, of course, shaped by my
former work as counsel to FDA.
For students of administrative law and for lawyers practicing before administrative agencies, terms such as “administrative law” or
“regulatory law” bring to mind legal doctrines such as delegation of
legislative authority from Congress, for example, or statutory principles such as notice and comment rulemaking. These doctrines and
principles are certainly important to parties affected by agency actions, to counsel who practice before agencies, and to courts reviewing agency actions. I would argue, however, that these doctrines and
principles provide very little insight into most of the substantive work
in which regulatory agencies are engaged every day. In addition, these legal doctrines and principles do little to inform our ongoing national debate about the proper place of regulation in our economic
system.
Two fundamental questions must be addressed to understand and
to evaluate the work of an administrative agency. First, is there a
need to regulate in a particular area? And second, how should an
agency operate to solve the problem which was the reason for determining that a need for regulation existed? Obviously, one reaches the
second question of “how to regulate” only if the answer to the first
question is that there is a need or reason to regulate.
†
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Why, then, do we have an FDA? Put another way, do we need an
FDA? The predecessor of the modern FDA had its origins in response
to Upton Sinclair’s classic novel, The Jungle, which was published in
the early 1900’s. The Jungle is remembered most often for its graphic
depiction of the unsafe and insanitary conditions in the Chicago
slaughterhouses of the time. The novel is about much more than that,
however. The Jungle is the story of Jurgis Rudkis and his family, an
immigrant family who are living a squalid, poverty-burdened existence in Chicago. This family is oppressed by all the institutional forces with which they are forced to interact, including employers, landlords, and financial institutions.
There is nothing subtle about the theme of The Jungle; the bluntly
stated theme is that unchecked economic power acts in an oppressive
fashion. For Jurgis Rudkis and his family, there is seemingly no prospect for relief from this oppression. In the final third or so of the
novel, however, Upton Sinclair gives his answer to how the crushing
burdens of the Rudkis family and others like them will be relieved.
For Upton Sinclair, speaking through Jurgis Rudkis, socialism is the
answer.
The Jungle had a huge impact. The United States, starting with its
then President, Theodore Roosevelt, took to heart the social and economic problems which Upton Sinclair portrayed so effectively, but
rejected Sinclair’s solution. The American model -- the public policy
response to The Jungle -- was not socialism, as Sinclair proposed, but
the establishment of institutions of public power to balance, if not
control, the major institutions of private power. The United States
Food and Drug Administration is perhaps the most prominent example of this model.
FDA exists because of the belief that without regulation -- meaning governmentally established and enforced rules and standards -life-essential goods such as safe food and safe and effective drugs and
medical devices are less likely to be available. I submit that this belief
is rooted in fact. Consumers lack the information and the ability to
monitor the safety of the food supply chain once the world changes
from a place where people grow their own food or obtain it from their
neighbors to a world in which food is grown and packaged far from
where it is consumed, now often in other countries. Similarly, with
respect drugs, there is no substitute for a well-controlled clinical trial
to establish a drug’s safety and effectiveness and conducting such a
trial is beyond the competence of individual consumers. Consumers,
unprotected by regulations requiring such trials, are unable to judge
the safety and effectiveness of a drug.
The alternative to regulation in the areas of food, drugs, and medical devices is a marketplace flooded with products which carry no
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greater assurance of safety, efficacy, and purity than the unverified
and self-interested representations of those producing the products.
Because of the risks inherent in that alternative, there is a strong consensus in our country and, indeed, across much of the world that regulation in the areas of food and medical products is necessary.
There are many complaints about how FDA operates. These
complaints focus on the agency’s fairness, including the perception of
some that it is too close to the industries it regulates, its effectiveness,
its slowness, and the costs of compliance. What is notable, however,
is that few people, even FDA’s severest critics, suggest that consumers would be protected adequately, let alone better protected, if there
were no FDA and, instead, we had a system which permitted the unrestricted marketing, distribution, and sale of food and medical products. This is because not many people believe that the marketplace
alone or the marketplace supplemented by the civil tort system would
police the marketplace sufficiently to assure a reasonable level of
safety and protection. The food and drug regulatory system has its
weaknesses and most certainly it has its critics, but regulation in these
areas is generally recognized as far preferable to no regulation.
If the answer to the question of “why do we have an FDA?” is
clear and widely accepted, the answer to the question of how FDA
should operate is far less clear and is considerably more controversial.
Even after a century of food and drug regulation, there is no consensus in our country on many central questions. These questions include
how should FDA be organized to do its work most effectively; what
resources FDA needs to meet its responsibilities; and what percentage
of FDA’s funding should be general tax revenues and what percentage
should be industry paid user fees. And perhaps most significantly, in
the medical products area, there is little agreement on the core policy
question of how much risk FDA should tolerate when, for example, it
reviews products to allow them onto the market or when FDA acts to
remove approved products from the market.
Since the adoption of the first version of the federal Food and
Drug Act in 1906, Congress has enacted more than 200 laws related to
the manufacture, distribution, and sale of food, health products, and
most recently tobacco products. The agency, in turn, has adopted hundreds of implementing regulations and issued many guidance documents. Nevertheless, the regulatory framework is unsettled and there
are now, as there have been in the past, demands in Congress and
elsewhere to change the laws under which FDA operates.
The medical device industry, for example, is vocal in expressing
the view that FDA is too risk adverse, too slow, is a barrier to innovation and job creation, and that the solution is removal of some of the
regulators, or modification of the device approval process, or both.
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Another example involves the issues of cost and access to medical
products. Cost is not part of FDA’s current statutory calculus. When
escalating health care costs are one of the greatest challenges facing
our country, a fair question is whether it makes sense to divorce drug
and device approval decisions from questions of their cost and access
to these products.
There are also questions about whether the agency’s method of
regulating is the most effective use of its limited resources. For many
years, rulemaking has been the agency’s overwhelmingly dominant
mode of regulation. A preference for rules over adjudication is perhaps inevitable given that the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act is not a
model of clarity, an inevitable consequence of numerous legislative
compromises and piecemeal enactments. In addition, the sweep of
FDA’s regulatory reach favors rulemaking over adjudication. The oft
cited figure is that FDA regulates 20-25% of the US economy. It is
not practical and it is potentially unfair to regulate that much activity
one case at a time via adjudication.
The question remains, however, whether FDA has been too rule
reliant and failed to bring a sufficient number of enforcement cases to
make its rules credible. Over the years, while FDA’s responsibilities
have grown and the number of FDA regulated products has increased
while the level of enforcement activity has declined. In 1975, for example, the agency brought 435 seizure actions (those being actions to
seize unsafe or insanitary food or health products) and 29 injunction
cases (cases against firms to stop unsafe or insanitary manufacturing,
production, or distribution practices). Twenty years later in 1995, the
numbers were 73 seizures and 8 injunctions; by 2008, it was 8 seizures and 5 injunctions. There has been an increase in the level of
enforcement activity in the past couple of years, but the level of enforcement activity is still quite modest as an absolute matter and is
particularly so when compared to the agency’s overall regulatory output and the number of firms subject to its jurisdiction.
FDA was conceived, structured, and has operated as a domestic
regulatory agency, on the assumption that it could do its job by regulating industries making or growing products in the United States.
The world has changed, however, and the marketplace of FDA regulated products is now global. In 2011, nearly 24 million shipments of
FDA regulated products, food, medical devices, drugs, cosmetics,
radiation emitting devices, and tobacco products, will arrive at US
ports of entry. These millions of shipments come from more than 150
countries, from more than 300,000 facilities, and involve 130,000
importers of record. Imports of FDA regulated products have quadrupled over the past decade.
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Our nation’s heavy reliance on imported food, medical products,
and other FDA regulated products poses new public health risks and
requires major changes in how regulation is conducted. When, for
example, we experience an outbreak of food-caused deaths or illness
in the United States, as occurred not long ago with cantaloupes, tracing the outbreak back to its root cause is essential to limit exposure
and to prevent recurrence. This trace back task is difficult enough
when the product is produced domestically. The problem becomes
considerably more complex, but no less important, when the potential
source of the offending product is a farm or processing facility on the
other side of the world.
Increasingly, active pharmaceutical ingredients and components
of medical devices are manufactured outside the United States. A
central tenet of FDA’s regulatory regime is that these products are to
be manufactured in accordance with current good manufacturing practices. The rules governing these practices require that a manufacturer
has control over its manufacturing processes and is able to document
that control. FDA’s ability to enforce these rules through inspection
of non-US facilities is limited. Imported products also pose risks
from economically motivated intentional adulteration or counterfeiting. This has occurred with pharmaceuticals, human food, and pet
food.
American consumers do not have one standard for domestic products and another standard for imported products. The American people expect their food to be safe and their medical products to be safe
and effective irrespective of the product’s country of origin. FDA’s
challenge, therefore, is how to meet that expectation in a world in
which increasingly these regulated products are imported from other
countries. The realistic options are limited.
Scale and resources make it impractical to inspect with regularity
all the non-US production facilities, farms, and manufacturing facilities producing for the US market. There are also serious limitations to
using inspections at the border as the principal means of identifying
unsafe or otherwise violative products. These limitations include the
mismatch between inspection resources and the volume of imports
and the need for expedited review of many products to avoid spoilage.
Necessity dictates that importers be responsible for assuring the
integrity of their products. The framework has to be that those bringing products into this country are responsible for ensuring that their
products are produced, packaged, and transported in accordance with
science-based, prevention-based standards. The agency’s regulatory
responsibility is to articulate clear standards, while industry bears the
burden and the responsibility of compliance. The Food Safety Modernization Act, which became law in January 2011, reflects this ap-
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proach. The Act requires that each importer of food “perform riskbased foreign supplier verification activities,” the nature of which
FDA is to define by regulations.
The global supply chain of regulated products means that FDA
will increasingly need to rely on the regulatory regimes of the countries in which products originate and the countries through which
products pass enroute to the United States. This need to rely on the
regulatory regimes of other countries is a cause for concern, but is
unavoidable. The new food safety law requires FDA to develop within two years “a comprehensive plan to expand the technical, scientific,
and regulatory food safety capacity of foreign governments, and their
respective food industries, from which foods are exported to the United States.” That is a tall order. Moreover, this is a task which must
be approached with humility because no one can legitimately claim
that the food safety system in the U.S. is free of weaknesses.
The case for strengthening regulatory regimes in other countries
must be made on the ground that it is good for the exporting country.
Exporting countries have a strong brand interest in having US consumers trust the safety of their products. That trust will grow and be
maintained by developing the regulatory regimes of those countries.
The force of this argument is undercut, however, by competing demands for scarce public resources. Again, this is as true in the United
States as it is elsewhere. The United States Congress is far more likely to give FDA new regulatory responsibilities than it is to give FDA
additional budget resources to meet those responsibilities.
As I believe these various examples illustrate, FDA faces the tension of the difference between the strong consensus around the question of the need for FDA and the lack of a consensus around the questions of how FDA should operate and what it should do to meet that
agreed-to need. The gap between these two is not a trivial matter.
In the end, governing and regulating are not primarily about vision or theory; they are about execution; they involve managing complex organizations comprised of a large number of people of varying
backgrounds and skills and having them perform day in and day out to
solve tough problems like assuring the safety of the food supply and
assuring that safe and effective drugs and medical devices get to the
market while preventing unsafe and ineffective ones from reaching
the market. Successful execution of these important and difficult
tasks virtually presupposes agreement about how what needs to be
done is done. The absence of agreement regarding the “how” of regulation inevitably diminishes regulatory effectiveness.
We in this country are not alone in our concern about the effectiveness of our administrative agencies. I had the opportunity to visit
Beijing and Shanghai on behalf of FDA. In Beijing, I met with a
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group of faculty and graduate students at Peking University Law
School for a discussion about FDA and food and drug regulatory issues more generally. A young woman in the group asked the perceptive question of “how do you know if an administrative agency is actually making a difference?” This is a question which is not asked as
frequently as it should be. How, then, does one know?
The starting point must be for an agency to articulate clearly what
constitutes success. If an agency does not begin by defining success,
it can never be said to have failed or succeeded because no one, including the agency, knows what constitutes success or failure. To be
meaningful, an agency needs to define success with precision. An
amorphous goal such as protecting the public health is too general a
definition of success to be meaningful because it is not measurable.
Specific public health metrics must be identified so progress against
those metrics can be measured.
Consider, for example, FDA’s new responsibility to regulate, but
not outlaw, tobacco products. The Center for Disease Control estimates that 46 million adult Americans smoke. An enormous amount
of data has been accumulated over many years confirming the health
risks and costs of smoking. These data show that smoking is the largest cause of preventable deaths in our country, and that there are
enormous costs associated with treating people with smoking caused
illnesses. The public health case for reducing the number of smokers
is stated rather easily: reducing the number of smokers will prevent
premature deaths; it will improve the health of those who quit or never
start; and it will result in lower costs for the health care system overall.
As an example of what FDA is to do by way of regulating while
not outlawing tobacco products, Congress directed FDA to promulgate a rule requiring cigarette manufacturers to put graphic images on
cigarette packages depicting the health risks of smoking. The rationale of the proposed warnings is that having graphic images on
cigarette packages will affect behavior by discouraging people from
starting to smoke and encouraging current smokers to quit. Predictably, the tobacco industry has challenged these warnings on First
Amendment and other grounds and, as of this writing, the courts have
enjoined the implementation of the warnings. Assuming the warnings
are upheld and ultimately implemented, the proof of whether the images make a difference is whether the number of smokers declines.
That is, after all, the point of the warnings and, indeed, is the point of
FDA’s having jurisdiction over tobacco products. The purpose of
regulation is to make a difference, not to add to the volume of legally
valid regulations. Promulgating regulations is only a means, not an
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end, and it is certainly not the reason Congress gave FDA regulatory
authority over tobacco.
Food safety is another example. CDC publishes data on food related illnesses and deaths of which there are approximately 3,000 in
the United States each year. A relevant measure of the effectiveness
of the FDA’s increased regulatory activity in the food safety area is
whether those numbers, adjusted for changes in population, decline.
Fairness requires recognizing that there are complexities associated with assessing accurately FDA’s effectiveness. A critical part of
FDA’s work involves acting to prevent bad things from happening.
The most famous example of this is FDA’s failure to approve the drug
thalidomide when the drug was approved in Europe. FDA’s failure to
follow Europe’s lead prevented untold numbers of American children
from being born with serious birth defects. Success here meant injuries were avoided because a product was not approved, a type of regulatory success which is difficult to measure.
Nevertheless, and recognizing the difficulties, those who believe
in the importance of regulation as an essential tool in protecting consumers by preventing those with market power from abusing that
power, and I count myself in that group, must take seriously the task
of setting and transparently disclosing objective metrics against which
regulatory performance can be judged. There is great truth to the
statement that “if it is not measured, it won’t get done.” That statement applies to the wide spectrum of administrative agencies, from an
agency responsible for food and drug safety to one responsible for
filling pot holes.
FDA has made a start in this area. FDA publishes on its FDA
Track website data for the various offices and centers so the public
can see what the agency says it is going to do, what its goals are, and
how the agency is performing against those goals. This effort is only
a start, however, because the data tracked currently focuses on things
like timely completion of regulatory or administrative actions, as distinguished from measuring the agency’s performance in accomplishing its major public health objectives of, for example, reducing the
number of smokers, or reducing the number of food related illnesses,
or reducing the obesity epidemic which plagues our nation. FDA’s
timely accomplishment of its smaller regulatory tasks is not unimportant, but, in all fairness, those tasks are not the reason Congress
created and funds FDA, nor are these smaller tasks of much interest to
the American public.
The most basic principles of administrative law hold that administrative agencies are required to comply with the statutes pursuant to
which they are authorized and agencies are bound to comply with
their own rules. In other words, an agency must not violate the law.

2013]

THE GOALS OF FDA REGULATION AND THE CHALLENGES

431

While that much is to be expected, it is not sufficient. The law’s
equivalent of the Hippocratic Oath’s “first, do no harm” is not a reason to create an administrative agency nor does it provide a rational
basis for evaluating an agency’s performance.
In the century since The Jungle was published, there has been a
proliferation of regulatory agencies at all levels of government in the
United States. Despite this, we know too little about how well these
agencies actually perform. We need to demand greater clarity of
agencies in stating how their performance is to be judged and more
data about how, in fact, agencies are performing against those stated
criteria.
FDA operates in the sensitive space of public health, balancing
safety, risk, and benefit, and often it must make decisions based on
imperfect or incomplete information. FDA will always be the subject
of substantial criticism, some fair and some not. Unfair criticisms are
best answered and the larger case for regulation is made most effectively by FDA’s articulating clearly the criteria against which agency
performance should be judged and disclosing in real time actual agency performance data. The need for an effective FDA is every bit as
great now as it was at the time of The Jungle and, arguably, the task of
protecting Americans is more complicated now than it was then.
Disparaging government is currently highly fashionable in our
country. We should be cautious about this tendency and remember
that we need our governmental institutions and we need them to work.
The wholesale trashing of public institutions and those who work to
maintain those institutions weakens the institutions, and thereby
weakens their ability to protect the public. We need to return to a
time when public service is honored, respected and, yes, encouraged.
The active debates in this country about regulation are close to the
core of our never ending national debate about the proper role of government, including the role of the federal government as compared to
that of state and local governments. Demonstrated agency performance will increase public support for the critically important work
which administrative agencies, like FDA, do and ultimately provides
the best answer to the question of why we need these agencies and,
indeed, why we need an effective government.

